This preview was written by Catalina Bush (@cata-bush on Bluesky).
Catalina is a Data Analytics Intern with the Syracuse men’s soccer team and studies Sport Analytics at Syracuse’s Falk College. Previously, her work has been published in Sounder at Heart and American Soccer Analysis, and she regularly shares MLS, NWSL and USL data visualizations on Bluesky. She is from the Pacific Northwest and passionately supports the US and Colombian national teams in equal measure. Catalina has written here several times previously, most recently on big boy midfielders.
There is no point diagnosing a team that must already be aware of its disease. Manchester United Football Club are stuck in a spiral of never-ending sameness; as Kim put it in her Bryan Mbeumo wrap-up: “I’m sick of saying the same thing about every Manchester United transfer.” Grace Robertson made a similar point in June: “If we’re being real, everyone in football media could just keep publishing the same Manchester United article, swap out a few names, and it’d be mostly accurate.”
What, then, is the value in rehashing a failure that occurs every year, and appears likely to continue occurring? Perhaps it is that the most recent failure in the previous season has been the worst of them all. United’s lowest ever Premier League finish, their lowest ever EPL point total, their fewest EPL goals, so on and so forth. United are in free fall — this summer, now, is the point at which something must happen if the Reds wish to avoid another mid-table finish. Relegation, forever a joke, was a tad too close for comfort last season. Will that persist? Will the team turn things around? Is the club fixable, or, like Old Trafford’s leaky roof, is collapse inevitable?
How good were they last year?
There are hardly any positives when it comes to the 2024/25 United campaign, but I’ll start with what few there are before moving to the really bad stuff. Despite posting a negative xGD — something which is unusual for United — the Reds’ improved in comparison to 2023/24. In Ten Hag’s last full season in charge, Manchester United had a -10.64 xGD, which was cut to just -0.34 last season. This did not reflect in the goal tallies; United conceded about on par with their xGA but scored 9 less than expected. While things were bad, the good news is that the underlying numbers weren’t even worse.
Non-penalty xG | Goals | |
|---|---|---|
Scored | 47.15 | 38 |
Conceded | 47.49 | 49 |
The team did not show any improvement after a managerial change, and turned in some very poor performances late in the year as they rotated the squad and focused on Europa League.

What is Ruben Amorim’s deal?
It’s no secret that United have a goal-scoring problem. The team’s top goalscorers were Bruno Fernandes and Amad Diallo, two players that are theoretically more creators than finishers. It’s not for a lack of trying, either; United took shots, but averaged a low xG/shot and thus ended with less xG per 90 than the Premier League average. Otherwise, Manchester United achieved the impressive feat of being absolutely uninteresting in attack:

Their defense was not much different in the aggregate, though it did feature a comical 0.12 xG per shot conceded.

Much has been made of how Ruben Amorim is or is not changing the “United way,” but it’s likely that we haven’t seen the fully formed Amorim yet. The Portuguese coach inherited a ship filled with holes halfway through a season — there was little time to implement ideas or, more importantly, decide where each player should be playing. Especially when switching formations, it’s important to find the right place for every player such that the team is one filled with strengths, not weaknesses. Amorim was not afforded that time in the winter. He has it now.
Like many in a long line of post-Ferguson United managers, Amorim has been backed with a sizeable budget to sign his players (so that can replace those of the manager before him). What that means, in practical terms, is that Amorim will be adding attackers with profiles that fit the 3-4-2-1 system, rather than profiles that bend it. Whether or not that’s the correct decision is up to personal interpretation. It’s undeniable that Alejandro Garnacho was one of United’s better players last season, and yet, he never fit the position Amorim found for him. At moments, it seemed as if this compromise — Garnacho, a hallmark of traditional, direct United ways, and Amorim’s tactics — could birth a new kind of 3-4-2-1 that was distinctly Man United. That ship has seemingly passed; Garnacho seems to be on his way out and Amorim has already secured his replacement. Where, then, does Amorim have this squad headed?
While it’s difficult to draw too many conclusions from his time at Sporting, given their utter dominance in the Portuguese league, a look at his former team’s stats may provide some insight. While the popular image of Amorim is that of a possession-favoring anti-United manager, Sporting completed 1.44 counter attacking shots per 90 in the 2023-24 season, far more than United’s 0.73 prior to Amorim’s arrival. As I said before, Garancho could have provided this direct outlet in Amorim’s setup, but even without him, nothing leads me to believe that United will abandon direct play entirely.
Other likely Amorim influences include more crossing and a more aggressive press, both changes that began to take effect toward the end of last season. The result was never going to be Sporting — the Premier League’s level of competition was always going to limit the efficacy of Amorim’s tactics — yet, however this New United turns out, it will likely be part Portuguese, part Mancunian.
How has the squad changed?
As previously mentioned, United underperformed their xG last season. In order to fix that, they’ve recruited the Premier League’s top two xG overperformers, Mbeumo and Matheus Cunha. That’s how these things work, right? Right?
Players out: FW Marcus Rashford, MF Christian Eriksen, CB Victor Lindelöf, CB Jonny Evans
The major storyline is Marcus Rashford’s loan move to Barcelona. It was common knowledge that Rashford wanted a move to Catalonia, and given United’s troubled history with the closest thing they have to a talisman, it seemed the right move to allow the No. 10 some breathing space.
Christian Eriksen, Victor Lindelöf, and Jonny Evans have all become free agents or retired.
Despite perennially promising a “clear out” sale of players, such moves have yet to materialize for United. In fact, the Reds have yet to sell a player this summer. Alejandro Garnacho has made it clear he wants to leave for another Premier League team, and although he’s still technically a United player, I wouldn’t be surprised to see a late deal come in for the Argentinian. United will probably panic, try to cut their losses, and accept an offer of £22 million + £3 million in add-ons. It’s Anthony Elanga all over again.
Players in: FW Matheus Cunha, FW Bryan Mbeumo
For more in depth analysis on these two players, I’ll direct you here and here for transfer breakdowns on Mbeumo and Cunha, respectively. The gist is this: they’re not bad players, but both are 6-8 goal contributors, not 15-20 goal stars. United are bad at negotiating fees, and thus the prices are way too high. That’s not the players’ fault, but it will still hang over them, and they likely won’t live up to it anyway. This will make selling them on even harder, so United are stuck with these two for a while; you better hope it works out. Did I do a good job of summarizing every United transfer in the 21st century? Let me know in the comments.
Between the two, I’m a little higher on Cunha than Mbeumo. Mbeumo, despite placing higher in the golden boot rankings last season, averages less xG per 90 than Cunha. If Bruno Fernandes is consistently deployed in the midfield two, an attacking line that features Cunha and Mbeumo isn’t anything to scoff at. Yet, it heaps additional pressure onto the shoulders of Mainoo, Casemiro, Ugarte, or whoever is unfortunate enough to play the No. 6 role, and it still fails to solve the No. 9 dilemma.

A positive knock-on effect, however, is Mbeumo’s impact on Amad Diallo. I have long been a proponent of Amad at wing back, and with Mbeumo effectively taking Amad’s spot, we might very well see him there. The added danger of a wing back that can actually score consistently — no hate, Mazraoui and Dalot — will only bolster United’s renewed frontline. Further, it reduces the toll on those aforementioned fullbacks; Dalot and Mazraoui played a combined 5661 minutes in the Premier League last season. The potential downside of such a change is its ramifications on the defense, but at this point, if there is any chance to improve, it will come through scoring frequently, not grinding out 1-0 wins (as we know, United are not capable of that).
As always, the striker rumors continue flying for United, with Benjamin Sesko emerging as the most likely option. Considering United have been linked to Sesko for the last three decades, the move would make sense. The Red Devils have already been extorted twice this summer, why not make it three times?
A quick summary of ins and outs:
xG + xA | OBV | Minutes Played | |
|---|---|---|---|
Out | 7.01 | 7.34 | 3449 |
In | 29.61 | 21.02 | 6634 |
Despite our issues with the value for money on Mbeumo and Cunha, they will certainly add something to United’s attack.
Star player they’re depending on: Bruno Fernandes
Earlier this summer, it was rumored that Al-Hilal had submitted a £100 million bid for Bruno Fernandes. On the one hand, a hundred million for a 30-year-old is nothing to take lightly — another club would be dumb to refuse. On the other hand, this is United, and they probably wouldn’t spend that £100 million well anyway.
This is a guy who, as despised as he may be, commands respect as one of the Premier League’s top players. Despite United’s much-discussed low attacking production, Fernandes ranked in the 96th percentile for Pass OBV and averaged 0.18 open play xG assisted per 90. Perhaps even more impressive is his ability to keep possession; Fernandes’ 2.09 turnovers per 90 is markedly low for an attacking midfielder of his profile.

The question plaguing United fans is this: how long will he last? As previously mentioned, the man is 30, and one must imagine that he won’t be able to keep up this level of play forever. I doubt this will be the year that he begins to decline, but at some point, he will. What succession plan is there? What do you do when the player that all but defines your team retires? These are questions that Amorim will need to find answers to, and soon. For now, this is essentially Bruno’s team; nothing, except maybe age, can change that.
A tale of two goalies
It is no secret that Andre Onana has struggled during his time at United. Even when things were at their lowest, Altay Bayindir, United’s backup, rarely got consistent looks at goalkeeper. This seemed to be an Erik Ten Hag preference, however; Amorim has been more receptive to rotation at the back, with 8 of Bayindir’s 10 starts in all competitions last season coming under the new manager.
The backup has not been immune to blunders of his own, but put together a string of consistently unproblematic performances toward the end of the season. With Onana injuring his hamstring in training earlier this summer, it’s fair to say that United’s goalkeeper position is at its most uncertain point since Onana was signed. Will Amorim allow Bayindir a run at starter until Onana is fully healthy? Will Onana recover before the end of pre-season and reclaim his spot? United have been linked with Emiliano Martínez in recent weeks; will he be brought in to supersede both?
In recent seasons, we’ve seen teams make use of rotation at keeper to generate competition and raise the level of goalkeeping across the board. This tactic, most notably deployed by Arsenal with Raya and Ramsdale, is similar to how NFL teams prefer “running back by committee” to one star player. United could easily take this route, and while it wouldn’t offer solidity in goal, it would likely raise the floor of both Onana and Bayindir. Both keepers are currently playing at similar levels, so why not have some friendly (or not-so-friendly) competition?

Even if Onana comes out on top, Bayindir’s value will almost certainly be increased by consistent playing time — provided his form doesn’t significantly drop. United are very, very bad at selling players. With Bayindir and Onana, they have an opportunity to recoup at least some of the combined £51.5 million they spent on both players. They should take it.
Projected best XI and prediction
The backline has potential to change with the emergence of Ayden Heaven, Mazrauoi’s ability to play LCB, and Luke Shaw’s return from injury, but United’s most likely back 3 remains De Ligt, Maguire, and Yoro. Ugarte will almost certainly start alongside Fernandes in midfield, with Dorgu, Dalot, Amad, and Mazraoui taking turns on either wing. Up top, both new signings will slot right in, with one of Hojlund and Zirkzee dropping in at striker, at least until one of them is sold and a new player arrives. Here’s the likely first choice XI for Manchester United in 2025/26:

This team is better than 15th, but nowhere near the top 4. Expect a regression to the mean, though my colleagues don’t think it’ll be a massive one.
Prediction: 9th

