As the final whistle blew for the 2025-26 season and Tottenham were confirmed to remain in the Premier League for another year, the focus turned to the transfer market. Having finished in 17th place in back to back seasons, and with Roberto De Zerbi in the fold on a long-term contract after preserving their top-flight status, there was acceptance of the squad needing a substantial refresh.

Even the most jaded Spurs fan couldn’t have predicted how aggressive the club would be financially during the summer transfer window. Over £300 million has been spent before accounting for add-ons. Jan Paul van Hecke, Sávio, Mateus Fernandes, and Sandro Tonali were brought in on major money deals (Tonali as the club’s record signing). Omar Marmoush was signed on a loan deal with an obligation to buy (£50m + £10m in possible add-ons). There were also notable free transfers in Marcos Senesi and Andy Robertson. “Bomba” became the word of the summer if you supported the club.

You can certainly criticize Tottenham’s summer spending from the standpoint of how insular their search was. Every deal completed was from a club who played in the PL last season. While an optimist would say that many of the players signed on a fee are of worthwhile quality relative to their position, even they’d concede it was done on premium prices in an attempt to buy certainty. A summer in which PL domestic trading rose to unprecedented levels saw Spurs as the biggest culprit.

It’s not hard to see what some of the marquee signings could bring to the table. Van Hecke’s impressive progressive passing should help with the early stages of buildup. Fernandes being a dual threat to play incisive passes between the lines or drive forward individually can be a boon in the middle third. Meanwhile, Tonali’s ability to cover space defensively is rivaled by few in the world.

In comparison, there are more question marks with the attacking talents coming through. Both Sávio and Omar Marmoush were brought in by Manchester City after thriving in Spain and Germany respectively. However, by the end of last season, they were relegated to rotation options. One would’ve expected Tottenham to get some kind of discount on the fees being paid after accounting for recent performances, but instead the opposite has happened.

Is there any logic behind these expensive bets on Sávio and Marmoush? To try and answer the question, we first have to establish what made them such hot commodities in the first place.

Few teams were as fun to watch in 2023-24 as Girona. A side which no one had fancied to be anywhere near European qualification in preseason were in the LaLiga title race by February, before eventually losing steam and finishing 3rd. Their matches featured a ton of goals, and their 3rd place finish included doing a famous double over Barcelona.

What made Girona unique is you wouldn’t expect a side with the 5th lowest squad cost limit to be protagonists in-possession (although their existence inside City Group’s multi-club ownership structure made them a unique case). According to Markstats, they ranked 4th in possession and 10th in field tilt. More granular metrics like direct speed and passes per sequence from Opta Analyst had them near the traditional Spanish giants (Barcelona, Real Madrid).

Versus opponents lower in the table, a lot of Girona did in settled play under coach Michel was based on trying to overload on one side, before quickly switching over to the opposite flank. If done correctly, it can create dynamic opportunities and a certain flow while trying to crash the penalty box. This did bring concerns out of possession during matches against better sides due to rest defense concerns in the chase for attacking upside. While Girona did score the second most goals in LaLiga (85), they were middle of the road in goals conceded (46).

What made the setup work more often than not was having a live wire on the flank who could create positive actions time and time again. In Sávio, Girona had that caliber of winger. Part of his uniqueness came from playing on the left wing as a left-footed attacker. He would often try to attack the byline and set up crossing opportunities, or cut-backs if he was able to get inside positioning on his marker. According to Scout Lab, he was in the 82nd percentile among players at his position within the big 5 leagues for open play crossing percentage and 98th in expected threat from crosses. It was easier to launch those deliveries into the box since Girona had a resourceful penalty box maneuverer in Artem Dovbyk. Unsurprisingly, he produced his best ever season, scoring a league leading 24 times.

Sávio’s dribbling and ball carrying were electric. Looking at just simply dribbles per 90, Scout Lab had him in the 96th percentile. Deep carries? 94th. Carries which ended in a shot or chance created? 90th. His stop and start dribbles on the left side were overwhelming against fullbacks in the league. In addition, he would have these moments of expertly using the momentum of his marker against them before getting into premium spots around the penalty box.

The end result was a statistical profile which leaned heavily towards generating value through off the dribble prowess and chance creation. Sávio’s movement without the ball wasn’t robust. A lot of it stemmed from attempts at manufacturing quick combinations through inward movements. If not that, he’d try sprinting in the flank into the final third. Unsurprisingly, the shot numbers being very low are no surprise. Even still, Sávio submitted an impressive age 19 season.

In comparison, Eintracht Frankfurt’s success a year later came from a different dynamic. While most high-end attacks have consistent patterns of play when going up against a set defense, the German side struggled in that department. Opponents who had a coherent press were able to consistently generate high turnovers against them. Via Markstats, Frankfurt conceded the 7th most dangerous possessions lost (Unsuccessful passes, lost dribbles, or bad touches near a team's own goal).

Instead, Frankfurt’s success in attack came from being one of Europe’s best units at taking advantage of broken plays. Interestingly, they weren’t like Bournemouth under Andoni Iraola where thriving through controlled chaos included a fearsome press, as Frankfurt were mostly a passive side out of possession. Having multiple credible ball carriers and outlet passers made them uniquely able to counter from their mid-block, or even when defending deeper.

Where Marmoush fit in was that he got to be a high usage second striker with Hugo Ekitiké leading the line. His all-around skillset allowed him to fulfill different roles depending on the situation at hand. On the ball, while he wasn’t the most efficient 1v1 dribbler from wide areas, his capacity to handle a high volume while still winning enough of those battles made it work. The creativity shown was mightily impressive, looking to feed teammates into space all the time and taking advantage of the open space that the typical Bundesliga match has to offer.

Off-ball movement was also a notable strength of Marmoush, especially in the calendar year of 2024 when he got to play alongside Ekitiké. He could make runs in behind and provide depth if the Frenchman was dropping deep to receive. Another example was third man runs in tight areas. The reverse scenario was also true, which made them a terrifying front two when at their best. Those off-ball runs were complimented by an impressive ability to get shots off when given even the slightest of openings, including subtle sidesteps into a quick trigger without much of a backlift. There was also the three free-kick goals in three consecutive matches, putting him in rarified air.

This made Marmoush one of the best floor raisers out there during that half season with Frankfurt. 24 goals and assists from 17 league starts was frankly a ridiculous return for anyone but the all-time greats. There was definitely some good luck involved, since it’s unrealistic to expect someone to almost double their goals vs expected goals. Take away the positive variance, and you’d still have a top notch attacker at the absolute peak of his powers.

On the surface, it wasn’t surprising to see Manchester City acquire Sávio and Marmoush in July 2024 and January 2025 respectively. Both were thought of very highly inside of the game when pen was put to paper. Sávio’s signing from Ligue 2 side Troyes (also a part of the City Group) illustrated the murky nature of multi-club ownership since he never played a single minute for them. For City themselves, they were trying to add youth and dynamism for what appeared to be a discount rate (€25 million + €15m in potential add-ons). Marmoush was different in that he was firmly in his prime and a lot more expensive (roughly €70m). The club was struggling at the time of his signing (5th place and 12 points back of eventual title winners Liverpool), hoping he would bring a much needed injection of pace and energy.

In the case of Marmoush, adding a maverick who likes to be involved in a ton of possessions came with some struggles. You can still see some of what made him so exciting, like constantly hunting for space in behind versus various defensive structures. This was a period in which City under Pep Guardiola were struggling to find a balance between having ample off-ball movement and enough defensive solidarity vs potential counter-attacks. Marmoush’s inclusion did provide a boost, especially when facing man-to-man marking across the opposition backline.

While Marmoush was capable of receiving between the lines and operating in tight spaces, it wasn’t the most natural fit for him. Add to it the lack of counter attacks for City compared to Frankfurt, along with not having great chemistry with teammates, and it played a part in his numbers declining noticeably in the PL. To be clear, he was still producing at a very strong level, but not quite like one of the world’s best attacking talents.

Sávio’s spot in the starting XI differed in Manchester since he often played as an inverted winger. The life of a wide player under Guardiola is nearly every match, they gotta deal with opponents setting up shop defensively in lower blocks. Often in these matchups, there’s another trying to provide help for the fullback in the 1v1. On the right side, there were still the forays towards the byline. Almost all attempts to get inside of the defender were often with the left foot, which led to the occasional awkward moment. If he saw a 1v2 and tried to take them on, he often would bob and weave with the dribble to try and split the double team afterwards.

The numbers would suggest that although there were hints of Sávio struggling a tad in English football, he remained an incredible off the dribble threat. Statsbomb had his dribble & carry on-ball value rise from the 98th percentile with Girona vs 99th with City. Via Scout Lab, he was in the 91st percentile for successful dribbles and shot-ending carries actually saw an increase to the 98th percentile. One thing to note is Scout Lab’s dribble overperformance metric (actual dribbling success rate minus expected after accounting for the location of attempt and the distance to goal) actually increased from 3.8% (81st percentile) to 8.0% (93rd).

Last season saw both Sávio and Marmoush play a small role, combining for a paltry 14 league starts. Between ill-timed injuries, a deep run in the Africa Cup of Nations for Marmoush and Egypt, and further reinforcements being brought in (Antoine Semenyo, Rayan Cherki), cracking the starting lineup became very tough.

Of the two, it’s easier to see how Sávio fits for Tottenham. With their winger situation in flux due to injuries and prolonged struggles from guys like Mathys Tel, Sávio walks into Tottenham Hotspur Stadium as the highest upside talent out wide. One can poke holes at his skill-set, such as how much of his playmaking might take a hit whenever Dominic Solanke isn’t starting and getting on the end of crosses. The hope is the Brazilian has enough passing diversity to make him resilient no matter who is playing up front.

Marmoush’s situation is less clear. Most would agree that to get his best, he needs to roam off of a striker and be trusted to do a lot of everything. Even better would be if the game model in question created a ton of direct attacks for him to profit off of. If Solanke can overcome his injury woes, there might be something interesting to be had with the two of them. One argument would be to simply start him in the striker spot, hoping he can do enough of the dirty work while profiting from his versatility. Such a decision would be brave considering how many jumbo sized strikers exist in the PL these days.

What we do know is De Zerbi wants his strikers to help keep attacks flowing at a good pace through above average technical abilities. A notable example is his time coaching Amine Gouiri. He’s long been one of the most unique players in world football. Few can replicate the all-around brilliance he displays while leading the front line when in top form. As a result, he’s been given the label of being a 9.5. This kind of forward can help link play and combine like a No. 10, but still do enough inside the penalty area to generate shots and goals. An obvious example was Karim Benzema during his apex. Unsurprisingly, there’ve been comparisons over the years of the two due to both sharing Algerian roots, and the similar in play style.

Moving from Stade Rennais to Olympique Marseille at the end of the 2025 January window led to Gouiri and De Zerbi working together. Entrenched in Marseille's forward line, his associative play became a big weapon. There were tons of connective tissue passing in tight areas for nearby teammates. A striker of his mold needs the requisite touch to handle fizzed passes into his direction, and he certainly fits the bill. The ability to subtly flow into off-ball cuts immediately afterwards helped make up for some of his deficiencies in terms of acceleration. The numbers produced from Gouiri during this stretch were obscene.

Gouiri playing at such a high level helped reinforce Marseille’s attack during the backend of 2024-25. While they were second in Ligue 1 behind Paris Saint-Germain for goals both before and after the transfer, there was a slight jump in goal per game in the last 15 matches compared to the first 19 (2.27 vs 2.11). The underlying numbers in the trendline below show a much more drastic uptick.

Can Marmoush replicate what Gouiri brought to the table? He did start versus Newcastle over the weekend as the nominal striker, and had some bright moments despite it not being his natural position. The link-up play was promising, there were some moments of credible ball carrying, and incisive passes towards teammates who were trying to attack space. Perhaps with more reps, this can become more natural for him like it’s become for Gouiri, but it’s a lot to ask.

Make no mistake, the chances of Tottenham returning to a top level not seen in several years hinges a lot on how much value Sávio and Marmoush provide. Those two were not too long ago among the most exciting players out there. We’ve seen examples of clubs acquiring players from the bench of mega clubs, potentially at a worthwhile discount. This was not the case here, with both players coming to North London on massive fees (especially Sávio). Certain fans worry of the massive downside from such a conservative approach to squad building, trying to skip the conventional process in attempting to return to prominence.

Can Sávio and Omar Marmoush help turn things around for Tottenham? Only time will tell, but it’s a big gamble which could carry massive ramifications going forward if it doesn’t go Spurs’ way.

If you enjoyed this newsletter, we’d appreciate it if you would forward it to a friend. If you’re that friend, welcome! You can subscribe to The Transfer Flow here. We also have a podcast where we go in depth on transfer news and rumours every week. We’re on YouTube here, and you can subscribe on Apple Podcasts or Spotify by searching for “The Transfer Flow Podcast.” If you’re interested in football betting, check out this post on why we started Variance Betting.